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BOOK REVIEW 
War in the Trenches 
A.M.J. Hyatt 
Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Wwjare: Technology and the 
Canadian Corps 1914-1918. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1992. 
T his book should become a landmark in Canadian historical study of the First 
World War, for it breaks new ground, provokes 
new questions and is clearly written. The 
enormous number of casualties during that 
war are still shocking, and seemed, until 
recently, abundant proof of the tactical sterility 
of war. For many years the war was seen as a 
struggle between incompetent British generals 
and naive politicians. Gradually that picture 
has been redrawn into a more complicated and 
more believable portrait. But the Western 
front in the popular view has remained barren 
of tactical ideas and innovation, hence 
dramatically different from the Second World 
War. Rawling presents a very different account. 
He examines in detail the tools of war available 
on the Western Front, the manner in which 
these tools were used in the Canadian Corps as 
well as how they were developed and modified. 
More importantly, he concentrates on the way 
training schemes and tactics were developed to 
maximize the advantages of the tools and 
minimize casualties. The story is long, complex 
and inherently untidy, but it is well told and 
carefully developed. Not least of the book's 
merits is the fact that it avoids nationalistic 
overtones which so often accompany military 
history. It is a Canadian story which 
acknowledges appropriate debt to the British 
and to others. 
The Canadian experience in 1915 was 
painful. Poorly equipped and inadequately 
trained, Canadian soldiers were simply not 
ready for the situation which confronted them 
when they reached France. (A situation more 
or less mirrored a generation later?) Quickly a 
process of development began, but it was slow, 
continuous, and often brutal. While efforts 
were made to have inadequate tools replaced 
or modified (Colt machine guns, Ross rifles), 
other efforts were made to develop new systems 
incorporating unfamiliar weapons. Although 
the results were no "guarantee to clear cut 
victories," they were nonetheless significant. 
Rawling argues that Canadians at the Somme 
"learned that they had not learned 
enough. "(p.86) By the Battle ofVimy Ridge the 
Canadian Corps had developed a system of 
tactics "based on available technology that 
would allow the infantry to capture its objectives 
and hold them without the heavy casualties of 
earlier battles. "(p.88) In tracing such a process, 
Rawling considers not only infantry, but 
artillery, engineers, signallers, machine 
gunners, the weapons and equipment they all 
used, and the staff officers and commanders 
who studies the results. By mid-191 7, 
"Canadian tactics were a better guarantor of 
success than the haphazard rushes of 1915, 
but they did not ensure that individual units 
would survive intact. "(p.142) 
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At Passchendaele, usually considered the 
epitome of slaughter without clear purpose, 
Rawling shows that the development oftactical 
methods for trench warfare reached a peak. 
Perhaps no account of this horrible battle can 
be completely satisfactory. Rawling's story 
must inevitably be limited, and it sometimes 
leaves the reader somewhat uncomfortable. 
For example, his description ofthepreparations 
for the attack on 6 November (all of which took 
place in six days) can be justified by reference 
to documents written after the attack, but it is 
hard to believe that all of it could have happened 
in the time available. ("Units tried to develop 
the best methods of capturing pillboxes, strong 
points, and machine-gun 
emplacements, and they 
relearned the techniques of fire 
and movement, of leadership 
and command. Training was 
capped with full-dress 
rehearsals." (p.l60) Following 
the Passchendaele battle, 
Canadians continued to train 
hard and developed a system 
that would provide success in a 
modified form of open warfare. 
The account of "the Last 100 
Days," less fulsome than some 
will wish, nonetheless is quite 
adequate to support the story 
which Rawling follows-the 
development of tactical systems 
and weapon techniques. He 
concludes that Canadian 
success in "the Last 100 Days" 
of the war was remarkable, but notes that 
casualties were also remarkable. 
The cost of war is always too high, but the Canadian 
Corps' last battles on the Western Front were less 
costly than the disaster at Ypres or the massacre on 
the Somme. In the cold-blooded calculus of war, one 
trades territory or perhaps even the lives of one's own 
troops for those of the enemy; in either case the 
tactics of fire and movement proved 
themselves. (p .215) 
This book is important not only because it 
traces the untold development of weapons and 
tactics in the Canadian Corps, it also forces the 
reader to think beyond 1918. In this sense it 
contributes substantially to the notion that 
1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were two segments 
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of the same conflict. Rawling misses no 
opportunity to reflect on problems which were 
as real in the second segment as they were in 
the first. The impact of the tank (indeed of all 
technology) in battle was overemphasized after 
1918. In part this occurred because of the 
understandable desire of all who participated 
in the First World War to reduce casualties in 
a future war by using machines instead of 
men. But Rawling shows clearly that technology 
produced success only when it was combined 
with an effective tactical system, and when it 
was used in a manner which aided the infantry 
on the ground. Second World War planners 
could have profited from examining Canadian 
experience with tanks. As early 
as the battle of Courcellette 
Canadians concluded, "no 
action of infantry should every 
be made subservient to that of 
tanks. Tanks are a useful 
accessory to the infantry and 
nothing more. "(83) Later 
Rawling notes that Canadian 
experience at the Canal du Nord 
was a "foreshadowing of the 
next war, when artillery and 
engineers in many theatres 
would be hard-pressed to keep 
tanks, artillery and truck-home 
infantry moving over rivers and 
rough terrain. "(21 0) The key to 
the effective use of technology 
in both wars is provided half-
way through the book: 
"technology requires 
technicians who know how to use it [and who 
are] ... capable of applying available technology 
to solve the tactical problems of the battlefield." 
Like most outstanding works, this 
stimulating book can be disappointing when 
the author stumbles on a detail or fails to do 
what the reviewer would prefer him to do. 
Happily these details are few and far between, 
usually insignificant. The most distressing 
gaffwas misidentifYing an acount of the Canal 
du Nord by a a survivor ofthe 13th Battalion as 
testimony about Amiens. My greatest 
disappointment was the caution which Rawling 
demonstrates in picking a side on the debate 
over the efficacy of machine guns used for 
indirect fire. Twice Rawling reviews the debate 
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and indicates the nature of the controversy. 
(178, 214) But in the end he goes no further 
than his documents allow him to go. A 
commendable position, but it prompts one to 
ask how far can documents be trusted to 
provide an accurate framework for a description 
of the undescribable. Of course the question is 
unanswerable, and it must be said that the 
author provides all that he claims to and a 
reviewer should expect no more. On the other 
hand, the best thing about this book is that it 
provokes reflection on as yet unanswerable 
questions. 
A.M.J. Hyatt is Professor and Chair, De-
partment of History, University ofWestern 
Ontario. His is the author of General Sir 
Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, 1987. 
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